I. Solo officer risks & other truths about
active shooter responses
Although total numbers are small, an analysis of active
shooter events for the first time has estimated the statistical risk that a
single officer assumes when entering a killing site alone in pursuit of a
murderous suspect.
"[T]here is a 14% chance that an officer will be
shot when he or she makes a solo entry into an active shooter attack
site," according to a report issued recently by a research-and-training
team from Texas State University's School of Criminal Justice. "This makes
solo officer entry an extremely dangerous activity." Indeed, a
single-officer response may make an active shooting "the most dangerous
call in law enforcement," associate professor Dr. J. Pete Blair told Force
Science News.
In a study he headed, researchers were able to document
14 instances in which an arriving officer entered an attack site alone. In two
cases, the officer ended up being shot before the incident was resolved. "That
is not to say that officers should not make solo entry," Blair explains.
"It's hard to wait outside and listen to gunshots. A solo entry may be
fully justifiable as the best option for saving lives. But we feel that
officers should be informed of the risk and not make entry with the expectation
that they're not going to have to fight."
Blair is director of research for a specialty unit within
the CJ School called ALERRT (Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training),
which offers training in active shooter tactics to agencies throughout the US.
Calling on more than 200 experienced adjunct instructors, the group has trained
more than 40,000 LEOs since its founding in 2002.
Later this month (June 2013), a book by four ALERRT staff
members--Blair, Terry Nichols, John Curnutt, and David Burns--will be
published, detailing in practical terms what the group considers "best
practices" for successfully handling a mass murder incident. Titled Active
Shooter Events and Response, the 264-page volume includes a chapter devoted to
Blair's in-depth research of 84 active shooter cases that occurred in the US
between 2000 and 2010. What he documented, Blair believes, is essential for
police trainers to know as they work to develop meaningful instruction for
their officers.
Here are the
findings he believes are "most relevant":
• LOCATION. Active shooter events (ASEs) were most likely
(37%) to erupt in a business setting (factory, warehouse, office, retail
outlet), followed closely by schools (34%). About 17% occurred outdoors in
"public venues." About 20% of attackers went mobile, either walking
or driving to a different location to continue their attack. In nearly 40% of
cases, the shooters had no apparent relationship to the shooting locations(s).
• SHOOTER PROFILE. To be counted as an ASE in Blair's
research, an incident had to involve "one or more persons engaged in
killing or attempting to kill multiple people in an area occupied by multiple
unrelated individuals," with the primary motive appearing to be mass
murder. "At least one of the victims [had to] be unrelated to the shooter."
He excluded gang-related attacks. Shooters fitting his criteria overwhelmingly
proved to be male (92%) and most often were between the ages of 21 and 50,
although ones as young as 13 and as old as 88 were encountered. While all
shootings studied involved "some planning," only 35% of shooters
engaged in "extensive planning," that is, preparation beyond just
acquiring weapons and ammunition. This included "obtaining or drawing
diagrams of the attack location, possessing a 'hit list,' wearing body armor,
or acquiring the equipment/supplies needed to trap victims in the location or
slow law enforcement response,...preparing a manifesto, blogging about the
attack, or developing a media kit."
• WEAPONRY. "A pistol was the most powerful weapon
used in the majority" (60%) of ASEs, Blair states. "Rifles were the
next most popular weapon," deployed in 27% of attacks. In about 40% of
cases, shooters carried multiple weapons. Only 2% brought explosives to the
attack location. Very few (4%) tried to protect themselves by wearing body
armor.
• CRITICAL TIMES. The median law enforcement response
time after the initial report of an ASE during Blair's study period was three
minutes. The median time from first report to the event ending was also three
minutes. By nine minutes, the vast majority of assailants (73%) have stopped
shooting. Where events last longer, it generally is because the suspect stopped
shooting but barricaded himself or fled the scene. In the longest instance,
police arrived on scene four minutes after being notified. "A SWAT team
performed entry 18 minutes later," Blair notes. "The shooter was then
barricaded for approximately seven hours," until a SWAT operator ended the
standoff.
• FORCEFUL RESOLUTION. In 43% of the time, Blair found,
the shooting had ended before LEOs arrived. In about half of those incidents,
the suspect killed himself. About 4% of the time, he fled. In the remaining
cases, people on the scene subdued or shot the shooter. Once LEOs were on
scene, shooters still active were twice as likely to commit suicide as to
surrender. Of those whose slaughtering was stopped by police, nearly 70% were
shot, the rest physically subdued. In a paper summarizing his study, prepared
for the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), Blair cites the following
implications for training from his findings:
• Considering that roughly one in five ASEs occurs
outdoors and/or goes mobile, it's critical for trainers to "address
operating in outdoor environments. Movement techniques and other strategies
that work indoors in CQB situations may be ineffective--even fatal--in outdoor
environments, Blair cautions.
• "While it is true that many active shooters will
kill themselves either before the police arrive or when the attacker becomes
aware that the police are on scene, the shooter aggressively fights the
responding police officers in many cases," Blair states. "Officers
must be trained in tactics that will allow them to defeat the shooter should it
become necessary."
• While IEDs are uncommon, they have been encountered in
ASEs. "Officers should receive at least awareness-level training"
regarding identification and response to explosive threats.
• Officers should be taught basic mechanical and manual
breaching skills, to foil attackers who have barricaded doors and/or windows to
prevent police entry. Among other equipment, they should be familiarized with
"a variety of shotgun breaching rounds" that can facilitate entry while
protecting innocent parties who may be on the other side of the breach point.
• "Officers should be trained to deliver immediate
lifesaving care"--with tourniquets and/or wound-care kits, for
example--"that can stabilize victims" found at the shooting scene
"until higher levels of care can be provided." This becomes
especially important when EMS personnel "will not enter an unsecured
scene." [Editor's note: For a report on how one law enforcement agency has
worked successfully with EMS to better tend to medical emergencies at active
shooter scenes see Force Science News #231 sent 06/02/13.]
• Both outdoors and indoors, confrontations may happen
"at distances beyond which most officers can effectively engage threats
with a pistol," including large open areas outside and long hallways
inside schools and businesses. Patrol rifles are "far more accurate"
at much longer distances than pistols, Blair points out. Moreover, with a
substantial percentage of active shooters wielding rifles, "at the very least
we should place officers on an equal footing with their adversaries."
• With attackers often willing to fight officers and
often carrying weapons that will penetrate standard soft body armor,
"there is a need to upgrade the defensive capabilities of responding officers"
with a plate carrier for enhanced protection. "If we are going to ask
officers to go into attack scenes and confront armed gunmen, we owe it to
[them] to give them the best possible chance to survive and win the
encounter," Blair says.
In the new book from ALERRT, the authors identify three
levels of complexity regarding ASEs:
1. Of the cases Blair studied, 42% could be considered
"basic": a single offender, killing or attempting to kill at one
location, with no weaponry or other equipment beyond a handgun.
2. More than half of the cases (58%) involved at least
one element that made them of "moderate" complexity: additional
shooter(s), mobile or outdoor location(s), explosives, gas, attempts to
barricade entryways, body armor, and/or long guns. "Most contained only a
single added complexity," the authors say, but even that makes the
perpetrator(s) more difficult to defeat.
3."High" complexity events involve
"multiple teams of trained attackers simultaneously attacking multiple
locations"--in other words, "coordinated terrorist attacks," a
la the Mubai calamity.
"At a bare minimum," Blair advises, officers
should have the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to deal with a basic
attack. If agencies "want their people to be prepared adequately,"
they should also address the challenges involved in moderately complex events.
Although no highly complex ASE has yet occurred in the US, the book explores
the training required for confronting that threat as well, anticipating that
that day is coming.
At whatever level, it's important that training
incorporate SWAT-type tactics that have been specially adapted for successful
patrol-officer application, Blair says. With the occurrence rate of ASEs
apparently accelerating and law enforcement response times improving, it seems
inevitable that street officers will increasingly be expected to deal with
active shooters as first responders, either alone initially or in small groups.
Training for that eventuality is ALERRT's specialty,
Blair says. Usually agencies can obtain the group's hands-on instruction free
of charge, through a variety of government grants.
